1. Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review of Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues to see serious violations of international human rights standards on freedom of religion or belief. The single most important and the most long-standing issue is the fact that - despite undertaking to do so in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty - Turkey has not legally recognised non-Muslim religious communities in their own right as independent communities with full legal status - such as the right to own places of worship and the legal protection religious communities normally have in states under the rule of law. Even the majority Sunni Islamic community is not recognised in this way, instead being under the control of the Diyanet, or Presidency of Religious Affairs, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. Additionally, the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising freedom of religion or belief has been a series of violent attacks and murders on those not seen as “genuine” Turks.

Political background

2. The “deep state” - military, security and elite representatives who remain wedded to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s “secularism” – with overt state control of Islam through the Diyanet which reports direct to the Prime Minister – have been unhappy with the rise of the ruling AKP party. Atatürk’s “secularism” enshrines serious restrictions on the ability of non-Muslim and Muslims outside state control to exercise freedom of religion or belief. It is difficult to reconcile with the Constitution's statement that the Republic is a secular state, as this “secularism” gives state-run Sunni Islam rights which no other group enjoys. It also imposes controls on state-run Sunni Islam imposed on no other group, such as on the content of sermons. The Diyanet is funded with tax collected from all citizens, regardless of their religion or belief, and runs the only institutions permitted to train clergy in Turkey. No other faith, or indeed non-state-controlled Muslim group, is permitted to train its clergy in Turkey.

3. Among the many examples of the state definition of “secularism” are continuing and long-standing problems caused by the ban on religious communities' themselves owning property. Communities as diverse as Alevi Muslims, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Protestants, and the Syrian Orthodox Church have seen no significant progress in resolving property problems. Examples include no progress on recognising Alevi Muslim cem houses as places of worship and continuing vexatious legal cases aimed at depriving the Mor Gabriel Syrian Orthodox Monastery of its land.

4. As non-Muslim communities are under threat of violent attacks, the Interior Ministry issued a circular in June 2007 asking law enforcement forces to protect non-Muslim places of worship, and be watchful for plans to attack them. A number of plans to mount attacks were subsequently uncovered and prevented, for instance a plot to kill the pastor of a church in Antalya. However, this step, although welcome, addresses only the symptoms of intolerance, not the root causes.

5. Official protection for religious leaders such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate is widely seen by these communities as being designed as much to control as to protect them. Suspicion of the authorities’ intentions remains. Alevi Muslims broke off formal talks with the government over denial of their rights, expressing frustration at the lack of concrete progress in enabling them to exercise their religious freedom. Informal workshops involving representatives of the Alevis, the Diyanet and others continue. An August 2009 lunch meeting between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and religious leaders, including Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, was followed by a visit to two Greek Orthodox sites. But no concrete improvements ensued in their ability to exercise freedom of religion or belief.

The rule of law

6. The Mor Gabriel cases – which started after state officials unilaterally redrew land boundaries - highlight problems around the rule of law and how society does or does not understand this, which has a serious impact on freedom of religion or belief. Another trial drifting on with no sign of a verdict is of two Turkish Protestants, Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal. They are on trial for "insulting Turkishness" and defamation of Islam, following their involvement in a Bible correspondence course in October 2006. The trial in Malatya of the five men accused of murdering three Protestant Christians in 2007 has drifted on since its start in November 2007. In 2009 police
have avoided bringing witnesses to court on various occasions, and no verdict appears imminent. Hopes that impunity for those who attack Christians would be over remain disappointed.

7. Two recent victories in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2008 and a Greek Orthodox Foundation in 2009 - have still not led to the recovery of confiscated property. The ECHR appears to be the only realistic hope of implementing in law the right to exercise freedom of religion or belief - provided its judgments are implemented.

Violent attacks and murders

8. A recent series of murders has drawn attention to the continuing need to address the problem of the murderous intolerance of sections of Turkish society. These murders were of: Fr Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest in 2006; the Armenian Turkish journalist Hrant Dink in 2007; and of two ethnic Turkish Protestants, Necati Aydin and Ugur Yuksel, and a German, Tilmann Geske in Malatya in 2007. In July 2009 a Catholic German businessman engaged to an ethnic Turk, Gregor Kerkeling, was murdered by a mentally disturbed young man for being a Christian.

9. In August 2009 Turkish Protestant Ismail Aydin, who works for an association spreading knowledge about Christianity, was taken hostage at knifepoint. The young man responsible claimed that “this missionary dog is trying to divide the country” and wrapped a Turkish flag around Aydin's head. He was seen on TV reports telling his captor that “this flag is mine as well! I’m a Turk too, but I’m a Christian.” His captor responded that “you have betrayed the Turkish flag and country”. The police rescued Aydin and the attacker is being prosecuted. But the incident highlighted again the dangerous unwillingness of many within Turkey to accept that there are many ways to be a Turk.

What fuels violent attacks and murders?

10. Factors which encourage violence include; disinformation by public figures and the mass media; the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the marginalisation of smaller groups within society. All three trends feed off each other, and all of Turkey's smaller religious or belief communities – those within Islam and Christianity, as well as Jehovah's Witnesses, atheists and agnostics - are affected by them. There has been disinformation and defamation against Christians, in particular against Protestants who share their beliefs with others in public discourse as well as in the media.

11. A day after the Malatya murders, Niyazi Güney, a senior Justice Ministry official, told Turkish parliamentarians that "missionary work is even more dangerous than terrorism and unfortunately is not considered a crime in Turkey". He repeated this in Milliyet newspaper. Terrorism and missionary activity are thus presented as connected. Almost any manifestation of Christian belief – including meetings in churches - is seen by those who hold these views as "missionary activity".

12. Missionary activity has been on the agenda of the National Security Council (MGK), which is chaired ex officio by the President and also comprises the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of all the branches of the Turkish Armed Forces and several government ministers. In a February 2005 evaluation of current and future challenges to Turkish security, the MGK drew attention to "a need for social activities that will prevent the spreading of organisations and ideologies that will have an impact on Turkey's unity". It suggested that "abusive missionary activities should not be permitted". What exactly was meant by "abusive missionary activity" was not defined.

13. The Turkish phrase used for missionary activity in official discussions and formal papers, as well as by the xenophobic and nationalist parts of society, has extremely negative connotations. “Misyonerlik faaliyetler” can be translated into English as missionary activities, which does not convey either a positive or a negative evaluation of the activities. But “misyonerlik faaliyetler” has in Turkish the connotations of missionary scheming, plotting and intrigues. Both words have negative connotations in Turkish, and used together as one phrase convey a double negative connotation.

14. Associated with this is intolerance promoted within the school curriculum (see below).

Ergenekon and the “deep state”

15. The trial which began in 2007 of influential people - from the police, army, business,
politics and the mass media - alleged to be part of an ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon, has revealed
strong and widespread opposition among them to freedom of religion or belief. Ergenekon members
are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people, including Christians with a missionary
background. The Malatya murder trial is revealing plausible links between the "deep state" and the
murders, Turkish media noting that a link between the murders and the Gendarmerie (Jandarma)
seems obvious. The Gendarmerie, it seems, knew in advance of the murders and did not take steps to
prevent them. Also according to the media, Fr Andrea Santoro and his church were under surveillance
by the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police on the very day of his murder.

16. The media has featured documents discovered in the Ergenekon investigation proving that
the Gendarmerie actively monitored missionary activities in the Malatya region through informers,
before and after the Malatya murders. It should be noted that the activities being monitored were
lawful acts of teaching and promoting one’s beliefs. Unlawful disinformation or defamatory practices
limiting lawful enjoyment of human rights do not appear to have been monitored or acted against.

Media intolerance

17. Protestant Turks have noted a significant decline in numbers of violent attacks directed at
their churches and religious leaders in 2009. This is possibly due to a decline since 2007 in
defamatory mainstream media coverage of them. For example, a widely viewed national TV channel,
ATV, has stopped broadcasting reports of "illegal" churches, or Turks converting to Christianity.

18. However, intolerant reporting and commentary continues in local and ultra-nationalist
newspapers, as well as on websites and blogs. One local news website, Ilgazetesi featured an article
on 17 June 2009, entitled "Local Missionaries", stating that "The primary goal of missionary activity
is to break the resistance of the people to imperialism and abuse! Making them Jewish or Christian is
the second goal." The continuing intolerant mind-set of many is fuelled by such irresponsible media
reports, and makes members of vulnerable groups fear that violence against them could escalate again.

No legal status as religious communities

19. Full legal recognition of all religious communities would be a major step forward in both
achieving freedom of religion or belief as understood in the human rights standards Turkey has
ratified, as well as addressing the prejudice that non-Muslim religious communities are “foreign” and
not genuinely Turkish. At present, religious communities which existed in the Ottoman Empire
operate legally under an archaic system of imperial decrees and regulations that deny them full legal
status as religious communities and restrict their freedom to function. Communities which did not
have a recognised existence before the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 have little hope of
gaining any kind of recognised status in law. Articles 37-45 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, on
“Protection of Minorities”, should have led to the recognition of then-existing non-Muslim religious
communities in their own right, as independent communities with full legal status - such as the right to
own places of worship. But this has not happened, not least as the Treaty left it unclear what such
recognition might mean. Bizarrely, the government ministry which handles relations with Turkey's
many indigenous non-Muslim religious communities is the Foreign Ministry.

20. Non-Muslim communities which had so-called community foundations (such as
Armnenians, Greeks, Syriac Orthodox and Jews) gained a partial recognition which does not give them
legal personality (Tuzelkisilik). Therefore they have not gained as religious communities the kind of
rights to religious freedom that Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights envisages. But
communities which existed before 1923 without their having been recognised as communities did not
even gain this limited recognition post-1923. In practice, all these communities are on a very similar
legal footing to newer communities such as Baha'is and Jehovah's Witnesses which did not exist in
Turkey in 1923 and which today have no legal status as communities.

21. Even to those communities with the limited recognition which has been conferred –
without rights to for example own places of worship - the attitudes of the Turkish state can be hostile
and even threatening. This has been seen in the case of the Armenian Apostolic Patriarch Mesrop
Mutafyan, who leads Turkey's biggest Christian church.

22. Denial of recognition leaves the adherents of many faiths vulnerable to discrimination, as citizens have their religious affiliation recorded in official records. In this way the state indicates which religions are “legitimate” and which are not. The Baha’i community has about 10,000 members, but is not recognised as a religion. As the Baha’i faith therefore cannot be chosen in the public registry, Baha’is are forced to choose either Islam or leave the religion part of their Identity Card empty.

Who can own places of worship?

23. An aspect of this non-recognition is that even recognised religious communities cannot themselves own properties such as places of worship. Bizarrely, these must be owned by separate foundations not under the direct control of the communities. This has drawn much attention, focused on the passage of a series of Foundation laws – none of which have solved the basic problem. The most recent Foundations Law – as usual - does not allow Muslim or non-Muslim religious communities to legally exist as themselves or own their own places of worship. For most non-Muslim communities, these are owned by community foundations. This leads to serious problems, such as that only the state can legally make even basic building repairs. Although the 1923 Lausanne Treaty obliges the state to make such repairs, it has never to Forum 18's knowledge done this. As Dilek Kurban of the respected TESEV Foundation noted, the Law is “incompatible with the principle of freedom of association, which is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution and the [1923] Treaty of Lausanne”.

Stalemate for Alevi Muslims

24. Alevi Muslims form between 20 and 30 per cent of the population, but the overwhelming majority of their places of worship – cemevi or cem houses – are not recognised by the state. As well as this and the problem of biased religious education in schools, another cause of frustration for Alevis is that their leaders – called “Dede” or elders - are not entitled to legally hold that title. This dates back to 1925, when Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) “On the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles” was brought in. This abolished the title, and Article 174 (Preservation of Reform Laws) of the Constitution makes it impossible to change this Law. This Article states: “No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.” Among the laws listed is Act 677.

Education about religion or belief

25. In contrast to the children adhering to the two non-Muslim religious communities acknowledged in the education system - Christians and Jews – Alevis, Baha’is, children of other faiths and atheists are forced to attend de facto Sunni religious education classes in public and private schools. State authorities, especially the Diyanet, have stated that Alevism is a part of Sunni Islam. This means that Turkey has not seen any need to alter the religious education curriculum. In a court ruling (Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, Application no. 1448/04) the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated that this is unacceptable.

26. Turkey is obliged by this judgment to take action to ensure that the same problem does not reoccur for anyone. However, as Turkish news agencies reported on 25 August 2008, then Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik claimed the decision was about the old curriculum. As Alevi beliefs are included in the new curriculum, the Minister claimed the ECHR judgment was inapplicable. Implementation of the judgment is still pending before the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.

27. Teaching of other subjects includes disinformation about or defamation of faiths. Missionary activity is listed as one of the national threats in compulsory public school books that are taught in Grade 8 classes on the History of Turkish Republican Reforms and Atatürkism. The textbook
states that missionaries “try to fulfil their goals through the significant financial support of foreign powers, some non-governmental organisations and from their own supporters. Missionaries exploit the financial hardships of people. They translate texts related to their own beliefs into different languages and distribute them free of charge and accordingly use written and visual media for their propaganda purposes. They are a threat to the national unity and integrity of our state and nation.”

28. Those at risk from violent attack think such sentiments – propagated through the school system and mass media – are major factors in violent attacks and murders motivated by intolerance.

29. As a participating State of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Turkey has agreed to implement measures “to counter prejudices and misrepresentation, particularly in the field of education”. Initiatives to assist this include the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools. However the authorities have shown no visible interest in providing fair education on religions and beliefs in schools.

Discrimination within the public service

30. It is virtually impossible to find people from non-Muslim backgrounds in high level civil servant or military positions. While there are non-Muslims employed at lower levels there are frequent allegations that they experience discrimination and are never allowed to take a high ranking position. Syriac Orthodox Christians, for example, have complained to Forum 18 that their young people are never allowed the possibility of careers leading to senior positions in the military or the civil service – even when they are fully qualified for such careers. Many are deeply disappointed, Forum 18 has been told, when they realise that they are not seen as “genuine” Turks, and so will never be allowed the chances to serve their country which those seen as “genuine” Turks have.

Religious clothing

31. Religious clothing in the form of headscarves has long been a controversial issue. The AKP party’s move to allow female university students to wear headscarves was prevented by the Constitutional Court, and caused much debate and hostility in the secular sectors of the population. Although it is prohibited to attend university wearing headscarves, or any religious symbol, this prohibition is not consistently implemented. It has become a symbolic issue that seems to embody the questions of whether Turkey will continue to be a “secular” country – as the state defines this - or not.

Conscientious objection to military service denied

32. Conscientious objection to compulsory military service is not permitted. Conscientious objectors of military age (including among the roughly 3,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses) face an unending cycle of prosecutions and imprisonments. In the ECHR case of Ülke v. Turkey (Application no. 39437/98), the Court found that such punishment was a violation of the prohibition in the European Convention of Human Rights of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Turkey continues to disregard the 17 October 2007 call of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers for it “to adopt rapidly the legislative reform necessary to prevent similar violations.”

Internet censorship

33. Access to the website of well-known atheist Richard Dawkins is prevented in Turkey through a court decision. His books, as also those of other atheists, are however permitted, despite legal attempts to ban them. Similarly, access to a website dedicated to Turan Dursun, a well-known Turkish atheist murdered for his beliefs in 1990, has been barred.

Conclusion

34. The protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or belief, as laid down in the international human rights standards which Turkey is party to, should be the standard used by the authorities in all affected fields. Positive steps should also be taken by the authorities to eliminate social hatred against all groups that are the targets of intolerant attitudes. (END)