



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRN/3  
30 November 2009

Original: ENGLISH

---

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL  
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review  
Seventh session  
Geneva, 8-19 February 2010

**SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR  
HUMAN RIGHTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 15 (C) OF THE  
ANNEX TO HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL RESOLUTION 5/1**

**Islamic Republic of Iran\***

The present report is a summary of 67 stakeholders' submissions<sup>1</sup> to the universal periodic review. It follows the structure of the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. Lack of information or focus on specific issues may be due to the absence of submissions by stakeholders regarding these particular issues. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the four-year periodicity of the first cycle of the review.

---

\* The present document was not edited before being sent to the United Nations translation services.

## I. BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK

### A. Scope of international obligations

1. The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OP-CAT).<sup>2</sup> The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI)<sup>3</sup> and FPC<sup>4</sup> recommended accession to CAT.
2. FPC stated that Iran had a record of creating generalised reservations to ignore articles or provisions in international law that it deemed in contradiction to ‘Islamic laws and the internal legislation in effect,’ citing, *inter alia*, the formal reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).<sup>5</sup>
3. The Committee of the Rights of the Child of the Isfahan Lawyers’ Association recommended steps towards harmonization of Iranian laws and justice mechanisms with CRC.<sup>6</sup>
4. ICHRI<sup>7</sup> and Education International (EI)<sup>8</sup> recommended that Iran implement the International Labour Organization Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and the Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively.

### B. Constitutional and legislative framework

5. The World Jewish Congress (WJC) noted that the rights of women, freedom of expression, of communication and association and of the press provided for in the Constitution had modifiers, including “*within the precepts of Islam*” and “*unless they attack the principles of Islam.*”<sup>9</sup>
6. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) recommended that Iran clarify the role and scope of Sharia law, address ongoing tensions with the standards set by international covenants Iran had ratified, and halt all discriminatory practices against non-Muslims.<sup>10</sup>
7. The Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV) noted that the Fight Against Human Trafficking Act (2004) not victim-oriented,<sup>11</sup> recommending that steps be taken towards coordination between the laws and the justice system with a view to safeguarding victims’ rights.<sup>12</sup>

### C. Policy measures

8. Farhikhteh Empowerment Institute (FEI) noted that Iran’s Fourth Development Programme referred to the drafting and adoption of comprehensive programmes for empowerment and protection of women’s rights (legal, social and economic), and their implementation by relevant authorities.<sup>13</sup>
9. The Health Family Center (HFC) noted that the Office of Women’s Affairs in the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Center of Women’s Participation Affairs and other organizations provided training for married women on women’s rights, including sexual and reproductive health.<sup>14</sup>
10. ODVV stated that the lack of coordination between institutions and organizations involved in the fight against human trafficking resulted in a waste of resources.<sup>15</sup>

## **II. PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE GROUND**

### **A. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms**

11. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization noted that recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing after his visit to Iran in July 2006, regarding continued discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities and nomadic groups, had not been implemented.<sup>16</sup> ICHRI urged Iran to issue invitations to the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on arbitrary detention, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders.<sup>17</sup> Freedom House (FH) recommended that Iran cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur on torture and the Working Group on arbitrary detention.<sup>18</sup> Joint Submission 2 (JS2) recommended cooperating fully with all international human rights mechanisms, including facilitating visits by Special Procedures mandate-holders and implementing treaty body recommendations, and that the Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate and gather information on post-election violence in Iran and more generally on the human rights situation, which had seriously deteriorated.<sup>19</sup>

### **B. Implementation of international human rights obligations**

#### **1. Equality and non-discrimination**

12. Sedighin Charity Institute noted that in recent years, the number of families managed by women and living under the poverty line was increasing due to traditional and legal limitations, and social and economic problems. More than 50 per cent of such families belonged to the poorest groups and 71 per cent of the women had low education or were illiterate and poor. It called for plans for removing deprivation and empowering women.<sup>20</sup>

13. According to Amnesty International (AI), women were discriminated against in the Civil Code, particularly in marriage, divorce, nationality, custody of children, and inheritance, and could not preside over a court as judges. Under the Penal Code, a woman's weight of testimony was worth half that of a man, women received half as much compensation for injury or death as men, and girls faced prosecution as adults at a much younger age than boys.<sup>21</sup> ICHRI recommended taking concrete steps to rectify legal discrimination against women.<sup>22</sup>

14. In relation to women's vulnerability after natural disasters, Rahbord Peymayesh Educational and Research Institute noted inequality in receiving facilities; aggression towards women; isolation in camps; and lack of information on facilities and services.<sup>23</sup> Zemzeme Sabz Javanan Institute cited excessive emphasis on the gender of the child as one of the most important barriers to growth in their creative tendencies.<sup>24</sup>

15. Ahwaz Human Rights Organization (AHRO) noted that Arabs in Iran faced discrimination in the oil sector and civil service. With inadequate political representation, they were unable to address the injustices faced in the economic, cultural, political and judicial spheres.<sup>25</sup>

16. EI noted that the Government had postponed implementation of the bill on non-discrimination in employment and education, which would guarantee to all Iranian nationals, irrespective of their gender, language, religion, ethnic and social background, equal access to education.<sup>26</sup>

## 2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

17. According to AI, there were at least 346 executions under the death penalty in Iran in 2008 and at least 318 in 2009. Over 100 of these had taken place since the disputed presidential election in June.<sup>27</sup> Extra-Legal Executions in Iran (ELEI) stated that the authorities continued to pass new criminal legislation with death penalty provisions and impose capital punishment for offences not codified in statute law.<sup>28</sup> The Balochistan Human Rights Council (BHRC) recommended declaring an immediate moratorium on all executions with a view to the eventual abolition of the death penalty.<sup>29</sup> Fundacion Mundial Déjame Vivir En Paz called for its abolition.<sup>30</sup> The Kurdish Human Rights Association (KHRA) noted that many executions in Iran were carried out in public.<sup>31</sup>

18. ELEI stated that judicial executions were still taking place in Iran at a rate of at least one a day, including juvenile offenders, for crimes that hardly ever constitute “the most serious crimes.”<sup>32</sup> FPC recommended a moratorium on the execution of minors in all cases including *qesas* crimes, and that the Government implement the Juvenile Crimes Investigation Act and other planned legal measures to end the practice of executing minors and those convicted as minors.<sup>33</sup> According to Stop Child Executions, as of June 2009, at least 1601 juveniles were waiting on death row for a wide range of “offences,” including homosexuality acts incompatible with chastity, apostasy, drug trafficking and involvement in school or street fights that result in a murder.<sup>34</sup>

19. AI noted that stoning was the penalty for “adultery while being married”, although a parliamentary committee had recommended that it be dropped from a revised version of the Penal Code currently under consideration.<sup>35</sup> CSW expressed concern at the possibility that the death penalty for apostasy might still be included in the Islamic Penal Code Bill.<sup>36</sup>

20. FH noted that torture of prisoners to obtain confessions and for inflicting punishment was routine.<sup>37</sup> AI noted that there had been many reports of torture and other ill-treatment since the disputed presidential elections on 12 June 2009, such as severe beatings, denial of medical treatment, and sexual assault, including rape. There had been official acknowledgement that at least some detainees were tortured and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered the closure of Kahrizak detention centre, where treatment had been particularly harsh.<sup>38</sup>

21. KHRA noted that the situation in Iranian prisons for Kurdish prisoners, particularly political prisoners and prisoners of conscience was critical. Torture was systematically practiced by prison guards.<sup>39</sup> Associazione delle Donne Democratiche Iraniane in Italia expressed utmost concern about torture and rape of young people in prisons.<sup>40</sup>

22. FH added that despite the prohibition of torture in the Constitution, the Penal Code did not categorize it as a criminal offense. Nevertheless, Iran’s *Majlis* (Parliament) passed legislation banning torture during interrogations in 2004.<sup>41</sup> ICHRI recommended promulgating legislation and revisions to the Penal Code prohibiting and punishing torture consistent with CAT.<sup>42</sup>

23. The Iran-Other Countries Friendship Association Supreme Council Network (IOCFASCN) cited the lack of access to accurate information on domestic violence and honour killings. It noted that women and girls who are the main victims of these abuses, often because of fear of losing dignity and/or lack of police support and sympathy, see these problems as private. Without trying to get help, they are subjected to the severest of abuses.<sup>43</sup> According to IOCFASCN, the most common abuse in Iran was mental abuse, making up 95 per cent of domestic violence cases. Physical abuse included assault and battery, hair pulling, burning, shoving, and occurred against all women regardless of

education, race and family situation. Non-payment of maintenance and financial exploitation were seen as economic abuse.<sup>44</sup>

24. According to the same source, honour killings were committed mainly in the Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan (among the ethnic Kurd population), Sistan and Baluchistan, and Khuzistan provinces.<sup>45</sup>

25. According to FH, juveniles imprisoned or on death row were frequently denied access to a lawyer. Children were subjected to torture and repeated interrogations without the presence of a lawyer, resulting in confessions and self-incriminating statements. Cases have been denied appeal even when alleged victims had withdrawn their accusations. Since Iran did not have a system of juvenile courts, children were tried in adult courts, where judges did not have the expertise to deal with juveniles.<sup>46</sup>

26. The Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children noted that corporal punishment was lawful in the home, as a sentence for crime in the penal system, and as a disciplinary measure in penal institutions,<sup>47</sup> recommending the introduction of legislation to prohibit all corporal punishment of children.<sup>48</sup>

27. FPC noted that despite the One Million Signatures Campaign's efforts to conduct its affairs in accordance with the law, dozens of its members had been repeatedly imprisoned on often spurious charges such as "propaganda against the system" and "acting against national security."<sup>49</sup> The Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners (ADAPP) noted that in many cases, Azerbaijani rights activists were detained arbitrarily by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence for an indefinite period of time. They were barred from family visits and prevented from access to lawyers.<sup>50</sup> JS2 raised similar concerns regarding ongoing repression of women human rights defenders and an alarming increase in harassment against human rights activists belonging to minorities or working on minority issues. It noted that in December 2008, one of the few independent human rights NGOs in Iran was closed.<sup>51</sup>

28. JS2 noted that spontaneous protests to denounce the official result of the 2009 election had been violently repressed and thousands arbitrarily arrested, including reformers, students, journalists and human rights defenders.<sup>52</sup> Unarmed civilians protesting in the streets had been killed. Following a large-scale demonstration in Tehran on 20 June 2009, shots were fired at the crowd from the top of governmental buildings where paramilitary Basij militias were stationed.<sup>53</sup> JS2 recommended conducting an impartial, independent and complete investigation, and that those responsible for killings and acts of torture against political prisoners be brought before independent and impartial tribunals.<sup>54</sup> JS2 further noted that in August 2009, a number of detained political opponents were brought before the Revolutionary Court, in unfair trials, aimed at intimidating political opposition and showing to the public the confession of major figures of the opposition acknowledging that there had been no electoral fraud but a general plot against the regime.<sup>55</sup>

29. According to Article 19 – International Centre Against Censorship (XIX - Article19), persecution of journalists and bloggers had heightened after the elections, with more than 40 prominent newspaper editors, journalists, media workers, cartoonists and bloggers arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned.<sup>56</sup> It added that journalists defending women's rights or writing for Kurdish, Azeri, and Arab publications and those seeking to cover the treatment of ethnic minorities faced particular repression.<sup>57</sup> State authorities frequently abused national security laws to arrest, detain and harass journalists.<sup>58</sup>

30. According to the Jubilee Campaign, persecution of religious minorities had worsened. Christians and Baha'is had been persecuted and threatened, experiencing arbitrary arrests and detention on charges with no foundation and with pressure to denounce their religion.<sup>59</sup> The Baha'i International Community (BIC) stated that in February 2009, the Government declared all Baha'i administrative arrangements illegal. Seven former members of the national administrative group had been arbitrarily detained since May 2008 without trial or lawyer access.<sup>60</sup>

### **3. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law**

31. AI noted that the independence of the judiciary was compromised, the independence and security of lawyers were undermined and, in many cases, particularly relating to national security, detainees were not afforded access to legal counsel until investigations were deemed complete. This led to prolonged periods of *incommunicado* detention, sometimes in parallel or informal detention centres, facilitating the use of torture or other ill-treatment to obtain "confessions". Such "confessions" were admissible as evidence in court.<sup>61</sup> ICHRI,<sup>62</sup> FPC<sup>63</sup> and JS2 expressed similar concerns.<sup>64</sup>

32. According to AI, the age for criminal responsibility under Iranian law was set at fourteen years and seven months for boys and eight years and nine months for girls. Amputation and flogging were provided for under the Penal Code.<sup>65</sup>

33. EI also noted that the criminal justice system continued to operate largely in secret and fostered impunity.<sup>66</sup> AI highlighted that so-called "honour crimes" may be committed with impunity.<sup>67</sup> According to BIC, it was very difficult for Baha'is to obtain legal recourse as attacks against them were condoned by the authorities and committed with total impunity.<sup>68</sup>

34. The Muslim Campaigner Women Society recommended human rights training on how to treat accused women as part of Iran's judiciary training programmes.<sup>69</sup>

### **4. Right to privacy, marriage and family life**

35. Reihaneh Alnabi Charity Institute recommended preventing marriage at low age as the marrying person would not have achieved personality and mental evolution.<sup>70</sup> The Women's Islamic Institute suggested changing discriminatory rules concerning divorce.<sup>71</sup>

36. Noting the existence of criminal sanctions, including the death penalty, against sexual activity between consenting adults, Joint Submission 1 (JS1) recommended that Iran bring its legislation into conformity with its international human rights obligations by repealing all provisions criminalizing such activity between consenting adults.<sup>72</sup>

### **5. Freedom of movement**

37. XIX - Article19 noted that travel restrictions were imposed on journalists, both within Iran and on leaving the country, along with interrogations and threats after returning from abroad. In January 2007, 15 women journalists were detained for questioning by the Ministry of Intelligence when travelling to an educational workshop on journalism in India.<sup>73</sup>

38. BIC noted that the freedom of Baha'is to travel outside or inside the country had often been impeded by the authorities and sometimes denied, with some having their passports confiscated or being placed on "no-fly" lists.<sup>74</sup>

## **6. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life**

39. According to The Ahl ul Bait (as) World Assembly, religious minorities such as Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians had the same rights as Muslims, such as seats in Parliament. They could study at universities without limitations. Women had no limitation regarding the type of Islamic cover and were allowed to be actively and widely present in different social arenas.<sup>75</sup> The Iran Modern Civil Defence Society suggested that members of recognised religions in Iran (Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism) lacked interest in finding solutions to their problems, suggesting that the Government establish centres for investigation of religious minorities' problems, with NGO participation.<sup>76</sup>

40. According to CSW, all activities of religious minorities were monitored by the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, and by the Ministry of Information and Security. State-supported religious paramilitaries often intimidated and assaulted non-Muslims, and state security services pressured non-Muslim community leaders to provide information on their activities and did not allow Muslims to join their worship services.<sup>77</sup>

41. AI noted that Evangelical Christians attempting to proselytize were often arrested, and converts from Islam risked harassment, arrest and may be threatened with the death penalty. Shi'a Muslims who refused to accept the principle of clerical rule were also persecuted.<sup>78</sup>

42. BHRC noted that since the majority of Baloch people adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam, religious workers had become Government targets for harassment. Two religious workers were executed in 2008 in Balochistan. Hundreds of religious activists had been arrested and remained imprisoned.<sup>79</sup>

43. BIC noted that the authorities had long attempted to prevent Iranian Baha'is from participating in social, educational and community-related activities, and from sharing their beliefs with others. For Baha'is, many of these activities were integral to their religious practice.<sup>80</sup> According to BIC, Baha'i homes were frequently searched and personal belongings seized by Intelligence Ministry agents. Many of those arrested during the past four years had their homes raided and items confiscated, including personal computers, and all printed material or possessions related in any way to Baha'i activities.<sup>81</sup>

44. CSW recommended that Iran immediately end all discriminatory policies, provide equal opportunities for non-Muslims and prosecute officials and state-controlled paramilitaries that commit human rights violations.<sup>82</sup>

45. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that Iran's 1979 Constitution set out basic rights to expression, assembly and association.<sup>83</sup> Yet these were invariably weakened by broadly defined exceptions. The Government also relied on a set of vaguely worded laws within the Penal Code, entitled "Offenses Against the National and International Security of the Country," to suppress peaceful activity or expression perceived as critical of officials or policies. It used these laws to deny detainees basic due process rights.<sup>84</sup> AI cited at least nine articles in the Press Code and the Penal Code, many vague and overlapping, dealing with criticism, insult and defamation, notably of state officials, and at least one with the dissemination of "false information." Punishments for such charges included imprisonment and flogging.<sup>85</sup> The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) recommended a review of such legislative restrictions, respecting the safeguards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.<sup>86</sup>

46. According to Joint Submission 3 (JS3), enjoyment of the freedom of expression had deteriorated drastically since 2005, including in the independent section of the publishing industry.<sup>87</sup> It added that censorship was comprehensive and arbitrary in Iran, and was both pre- and post-publication. Taboos included politics, religion, and sexuality. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance acted as the censor.<sup>88</sup> JS3 recommended Iran lift the permit system attached to the publication and distribution of books, formalise all administrative measures affecting the freedom to publish, and enable effective and transparent judicial review of all administrative decisions in this regard.<sup>89</sup>

47. XIX - Article19 reported that a leading reformist newspaper was closed following plans to publish allegations that protesters had been raped while incarcerated during the post-election upheavals.<sup>90</sup> It noted that individuals, including media workers, were routinely summoned to Government offices to be instructed or warned not to continue exercising their freedom of expression.<sup>91</sup> Private, independent broadcasters were prohibited, incoming foreign news tightly restricted and a state broadcasting monopoly in place.<sup>92</sup>

48. XIX - Article19 stated that internet access has been severely restricted and legislation proposed making the creation of blogs promoting “corruption, prostitution and apostasy” punishable by death.<sup>93</sup> Websites were required to obtain a license before publication, and were subject to the authority of the Press Supervisory Board. Online publications without license faced charges like propaganda against national security and “insult to religion”, carrying up to five years’ imprisonment or death penalty.<sup>94</sup> It recommended repealing all internet censorship restrictions and state blocking and filtering of online content, anchoring the online flow of information in the right to freedom of expression.<sup>95</sup>

49. According to HRW, by denying permits and selectively enforcing permit requirements, Iranian authorities routinely violated freedom of assembly. Since 2005, civil society activists such as women’s rights campaigners and labour activists have consistently faced the threat of arrest and being forcibly dispersed by security forces.<sup>96</sup>

50. The Khajeh Nassireddin Toosi Institute noted that one of the strategies for removing deprivation in the country was direct participation of people, particularly young people.<sup>97</sup>

51. The Karaj Shaid Aghaei Association recommended protecting the material and spiritual rights of inventors.<sup>98</sup>

## **7. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work**

52. The International Trade Union Confederation indicated that gender-based discrimination runs deep in Iran and affects women’s participation in the labour market. Although over 60 per cent of university students are women, they only constitute 15 per cent of the formal economy.<sup>99</sup> The House of Culture and Sustainable Development (HCSD) noted that women and men should be treated equally in employment, but women working in governmental bodies and private sector entities were paid less than men.<sup>100</sup> The Women Research Center noted that some employers did not believe women had scientific and managerial capabilities.<sup>101</sup> HCSD further expressed concern over inequalities in employment opportunities, lack of employment security, inappropriate employment places, lack of special support for women, economic poverty and dependence of women, especially housekeepers.<sup>102</sup> The Azarakhsh Entrepreneur Women Society stated that women and children who are forced to work to survive, work in the worst conditions, with the least job and social security and lowest wages. Seasonal women workers face a very difficult situation.<sup>103</sup>



53. The Business Women Council of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mine recommended promoting the employment of women workers in the private sector by providing incentives for employers to recruit, invest in and retain women workers, such as tax exemptions upon employment of more women workers.<sup>104</sup>

54. EI stated that the arrest, detention and condemnation of teacher unionists because of their union activities were not only serious human rights violations, but created an atmosphere of fear prejudicial to civil society development.<sup>105</sup> According to EI, as a result of intimidation by the Government, teachers were now reluctant to join independent teacher associations.<sup>106</sup> EI recommended adopting policy measures to respect the right of workers' organizations to organize, and to hold public protests related to work conditions and economic and social policy.<sup>107</sup>

55. The Iranian Stable Family Association cited unemployment and poverty among the reasons for youth crime. It also called for training of female entrepreneurs; education planning with regards to the needs of the labour market; and for attention to the training of groups with special conditions such as the handicapped and prisoners.<sup>108</sup>

## **8. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living**

56. The Dadandishan Rah-e Zendegi Association noted that the Constitution obligated the Government to secure social security for all people, but that housewives were not principally covered by social security insurance.<sup>109</sup> The Justice Thinkers of Path of Life Association stressed that education was necessary to improve awareness in this regard, considering insurance for housewives as a right. It cited estimates that there were 16 million housewives in Iran, calling for the existing insurance plan to be improved and made applicable to them.<sup>110</sup>

57. The Charitable Institute for Social Victims noted that men, single individuals, poorly educated migrants, the poor/beggars, low-income individuals or temporary workers, people with disabilities and addicts were more susceptible to homelessness. It acknowledged the implementation of several projects for welfare, social and family support, expressing hope that in the long run, their implementation would reduce homelessness.<sup>111</sup>

58. The Family Planning Association of I.R.I noted that a large number of people living with HIV did not have access to antiretroviral services due to high costs. Also due to particular physical and treatment conditions, these individuals were unable to work in several full-time jobs.<sup>112</sup>

59. The Health and Fertility Rights Network noted a decrease in the child mortality under the age of five, made possible through, *inter alia*, implementation of wide vaccination programmes, breastfeeding, control of diarrhea and acute pulmonary diseases.<sup>113</sup> The Iran and Arab Friendship Association noted a decrease in maternal mortality due to the establishment of a wide health plan, an increase in the number of family physicians and obstetricians in rural areas, the establishment of therapeutic health centers and hospitals, and encouraging natural delivery by experienced persons.<sup>114</sup>

60. The Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution cited as relevant to the protection of the right to life, the lack of clear laws for the conservation of separate water system such as rivers, wetlands and lakes, and inattention to the protection of all water sources and prevention of water pollution.<sup>115</sup>

### 9. Right to education and to participate in the cultural life of the community

61. According to BIC, Baha'i children and adolescents have been subjected to vilification and severe psychological pressure in primary, middle and high schools throughout Iran, and these abuses were committed by their teachers and school administrators.<sup>116</sup>

62. The Maryam Educational Charity Institute noted the Government's obligation to take effective measures in the field of education in villages.<sup>117</sup> According to the Corporate Social Responsibility Development Center, consideration of human rights concepts in secondary school textbooks was not followed in a balanced manner.<sup>118</sup> Imam Sadeq Scientific Research Institute recommended training in human rights in primary schools, high schools, university centres and through the mass media.<sup>119</sup>

63. The United Nations Association of Iran (UNA-IRAN) noted that Afghan children were entitled to education from elementary to high school but must pay annual education fees which, in spite of supportive laws with regard to cost reductions for the more deprived refugees, a substantial number of families could not afford. As a result, children were deprived of education.<sup>120</sup>

64. According to AHRO, most Arab villages in Iran had no schools. Indigenous Arab students dropped out at a rate of 30 per cent at elementary level, 50 per cent at secondary and 70 per cent at high school, as they were forced to study the official language. AHRO recommended that teaching of Arabic in schools in Khuzestan be allowed through the six years of elementary school at a minimum.<sup>121</sup>

65. The Supporters of Clean Nature Institute recommended designing development programmes for the protection of environment and cultural, historical and moral heritage.<sup>122</sup>

### 10. Minorities and indigenous peoples

66. JS2 noted that repression against activists belonging to ethnic and religious minorities was dramatically on the rise.<sup>123</sup> According to AI, despite constitutional guarantees of equality, minorities were subject to an array of discriminatory laws and practices, including land and property confiscations, denial of employment under the discriminatory *gozinesh* selection criteria and restrictions on social, cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms.<sup>124</sup> KHRA stated that Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, Arabs and others were treated as second-class citizens and their rights violated on a daily basis. Kurds had encountered violence and oppression more than any other Iranians.<sup>125</sup>

67. BHRC recommended that Iran stop forced assimilation and demographic manipulation, implement articles 8 and 10 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and not forcefully removed Baloch people from their land.<sup>126</sup>

68. BHRC further noted that Baloch cultural activists have applied to publish a journal in the Balochi language many times, each time rejected, or granted conditional on most pages being published in Persian. Some Baloch cultural activists accepted these conditions, and published journals or newspapers such as "Roos Dra" and Marz e Pourgohar. Both have since been banned and their editors intimidated and harassed.<sup>127</sup>

69. ADAPP highlighted that the Azerbaijani language is banned in schools, Azerbaijani language journals and journals calling for the proliferation of Azerbaijani linguistic and cultural rights are shut down and contributors arrested. Azerbaijanis are barred from political representation, deprived

economically and face high illiteracy rates. Shops with Azerbaijani Turkish names are effectively shut down and forced to “Persianize” the names. Many advocates of broader linguistic and cultural rights for Azerbaijanis are detained arbitrarily, held indefinitely and tortured, on occasion murdered, in custody, and released only to be tried and sentenced to heavy terms in Iran’s worst prisons such as Evin Prison.<sup>128</sup>

70. CSW recommended that Iran end its policy of assimilation and allow minorities to teach their traditions, religions, languages and history by textbooks written by their communities, and that it address the socio-economic concerns which occasion mass emigration.<sup>129</sup>

### **11. Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers**

71. The Iranian Life Quality Improvement Association (ILIA) noted that Afghan refugee children in Iran were among those constantly subject to domestic violence and grave violation of rights, due to poverty and their parents’ unemployment.<sup>130</sup>

72. According to UNA-IRAN, Afghan refugees with specific ailments could benefit from medical insurance services, but these services did not include all other refugees. The majority of refugees, due to financial problems, refrained from going to hospitals, resulting in the gradual spread of chronic diseases.<sup>131</sup>

73. UNA-IRAN noted the issuance of work permits for Afghan refugees aged 18 to 60 in some professions in 2009. Although this measure was seen as a positive step towards refugee rights, these people did not benefit from rights such as social insurance and unemployment benefits, which Iranian nationals benefit from.<sup>132</sup>

### **12. Human rights and counter-terrorism**

74. JS2 noted that ethnic and religious minority activists accused of terrorism, acting against national security, and even treason without concrete evidence were sentenced in closed hearings, often after harsh torture.<sup>133</sup> According to the Sadeq Ganji Cultural Investigation Institution, countering terrorism by expanding militarization has no clear results,<sup>134</sup> adding that the widening of democracy and strengthening of civil institutions was effective in preventing terrorism.<sup>135</sup>

## **III. ACHIEVEMENTS, BEST PRACTICES, CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS**

75. The House of Eternal Culture noted that all provinces in Iran had local TV and radio networks and most had local newspapers and magazines, creating capacities for the realization of the cultural and social rights of ethnic groups and promotion of existing local cultures by producing programmes in local languages and culture.<sup>136</sup>

76. The Muslim Women Justice Assembly noted that people with disabilities were supported. In Iran, those injured in the war with a neighbouring country were among the people with disabilities, leading to more serious protection in accordance with various laws.<sup>137</sup> The Mazandaran Red Crescent Youth Organization noted that most people with disabilities could perform ordinary activities.<sup>138</sup>

77. According to ILIA, fundamental challenges included the lack of a reporting system on domestic violence against Afghan children, the nonexistence of a specific screening process, and the absence of effective referral and treatment of abused children and the abuser.<sup>139</sup>

78. HFC listed as a challenge the need to sensitize Iranian society on issues of women's rights, reproductive and sexual rights, and sexual health.<sup>140</sup>

#### IV. KEY NATIONAL PRIORITIES, INITIATIVES AND COMMITMENTS

N/A

#### V. CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

79. FEI recommended that technical and scientific assistance be provided for the empowerment of rural women and the promotion of a culture of common responsibility in Iran, ultimately resulting in human rights advancement and elimination of gender discrimination.<sup>141</sup>

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: [www.ohchr.org](http://www.ohchr.org). (One asterisk denotes a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.)

##### *Civil society*

AEWS	Azarakhsh Entrepreneur Women Society, Iran;
AHRO	Ahwaz Human Rights Organization, Virginia, USA;
AI	Amnesty International*, London, United Kingdom;
ADAPP	Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners, Vancouver, Canada;
ADDI	Associazione delle Donne Democratiche Iraniane in Italia, Roma, Italy
AWA	The Ahl ul Bait (as) World Assembly, Iran;
BHRC	Balochistan Human Rights Council, London, United Kingdom;
BIC	Baha'i International Community*, New York, USA;
BWCTCCIM	Business Women Council in Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mine, Tehran, Iran;
CISV	The Charitable Institute for Social Victims*, Tehran, Iran;
CRCILA	Committee of the Rights of the Child of the Isfahan Lawyers' Association, Isfahan, Iran;
CSRDC	Corporate Social Responsibility Development Center, Tehran, Iran;
CSW	Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Surrey, United Kingdom;
DRZA	Dadandishan Rah-e Zendegi Association, Iran;
EI	Education International*, Brussels, Belgium;
ELEI	Extra-Legal Executions in Iran, New York, USA;
FEI	Farhikhteh Empowerment Institute, Iran;
FH	Freedom House*, Washington D.C., USA;
FMDVP	Fundacion Mundial Déjame Vivir En Paz, Costa Rica;
FPA IRI	Family Planning Association of I.R.I, Iran;
FPC	The Foreign Policy Centre, London, United Kingdom;
FRDI	Faragostar Rahbord Danesh Institution, Iran;
GOLAN	Gharani Ovis Khairiyeh Institute, Iran;
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London, United Kingdom;
HCSO	House of Culture and Sustainable Development, Tehran, Iran;
HEC	The House of Eternal Culture, Iran;
HFC	Healthy Family Center, Iran;
HFRN	Health and Fertility Rights Network, Iran;
HRW	Human Rights Watch*, New York, USA;
IAFA	Iran and Arab Friendship Association, Tehran, Iran;
The Campaign	International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, New York, USA;

---

ICJ	International Commission of Jurists*, Geneva, Switzerland;
ILIA	Iranian Life Quality Improvement Association, Iran;
IMCDS	Iran Modern Civil Defence Society, Iran;
IOCFASCN	Iran-other Countries Friendship Association Supreme Council Network, Tehran, Iran;
ISFA	Iranian Stable Family Association, Tehran, Iran;
ISSRI	Imam Sadeq Scientific Research Institute, Iran;
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation*, Brussels, Belgium;
JC	Jubilee Campaign*, Surrey, United Kingdom;
JTPLA	Justice Thinkers of Path of Life Association, Iran;
JS1	Joint submission by ILGA (International Lesbian and Gay Association), Brussels, Belgium; ILGA-Europe*, Brussels, Belgium; IGLHRC* (International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission), New York, USA; ARC (ARC International), Geneva, Switzerland; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Initiative at Global Rights*, Washington D.C, USA;
JS2	Joint submission by FIDH* (International Federation for Human Rights), Paris, France; and LDDHI (League for the defence of Human Rights in Iran), Paris, France;
JS3	Joint submission by IPA* (International Publishers Association), Geneva, Switzerland; International Pen*, London, United Kingdom; Index on Censorship, London, United Kingdom;
KHRA	Kurdish Human Rights Association, Iran;
KNTI	Khajeh Nassireddin Toosi Institute, Tehran, Iran;
KSAA	Karaj Shahid Aghaei Association, Iran;
MCWS	Muslim Campaigner Women Society, Iran;
MECI	Maryam Educational Charity Institute, Tehran, Iran;
MRCYO	Mazandaran Red Crescent Youth Organization, Iran;
MWJA	Muslim Women Justice Assembly, Iran;
OD	Open Doors, Harderwijk, the Netherlands;
ODVV	Organization for Defending Victims of Violence*, Tehran, Iran;
RACI	Reihaneh Alnabi Charity Institute, Iran;
RPERI	Rahbord Peymayesh Educational and Research Institute, Iran;
SCE	Stop Child Executions, Iran;
SCI	Sedighin Charity Institute, Iran;
SCNI	Supporters of Clean Nature Institute, Iran;
SGCII	Sadeq Ganji Cultural Investigation Institution. Iran;
UNA-IRAN	United Nations Association of Iran, Tehran, Iran;
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, the Hague, Netherlands;
WII	Women's Islamic Institute, Iran;
WJC	World Jewish Congress*, New York, USA;
WRC	Women Research Center, Iran;
WSAEP	Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution, Tehran, Iran ;
XIX- Article19	Article19 - International Centre Against Censorship*, London, United Kingdom;
YRKI	Young Researcher's Knowledge Institute, Iran;
ZSJI	Zemzeme Sabz Javanan Institute, Iran;

<sup>2</sup> FPC, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> ICHRI, para. 16.

<sup>4</sup> FPC, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> FPC, para. 6.

<sup>6</sup> CRCILA, para. 18.

<sup>7</sup> ICHRI, para. 30.

<sup>8</sup> EI, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> WJC, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> CSW, para. 9.

<sup>11</sup> ODVV, para. 15.

<sup>12</sup> ODVV, para. 19

<sup>13</sup> FEI, para. 14. See also HFC, para. 17, SCI, p.3.

<sup>14</sup> HFC, para. 3.

<sup>15</sup> ODVV, para. 14.

<sup>16</sup> UNPO, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> ICHRI, para. 10.

- <sup>18</sup> FH, p. 5. See also ICHRI, para. 11.
- <sup>19</sup> JS2, p. 6.
- <sup>20</sup> SCI, paras. 9, 11
- <sup>21</sup> AI, p. 4. See also JC, p. 4, FPC, para. 14.
- <sup>22</sup> ICHRI, para 26. See also ICJ, p. 5.
- <sup>23</sup> RPERI, p. 2.
- <sup>24</sup> ZSJI, para. 13
- <sup>25</sup> AHRO, p. 1.
- <sup>26</sup> EI, para 25
- <sup>27</sup> AI, pp. 4-5. See also BHRC, pp. 6-7, HRW, p. 1, ICHRI, para 6.
- <sup>28</sup> ELEI, para. 22.
- <sup>29</sup> BHRC, p. 7. See also ICHRI, para. 20, JS1, p. 1 and p. 3.
- <sup>30</sup> FMDVP, p. 4.
- <sup>31</sup> KHRA, p. 1
- <sup>32</sup> ELEI, para. 22.
- <sup>33</sup> FPC, p. 5. See also ICHRI, para. 23.
- <sup>34</sup> SCE, p. 1.
- <sup>35</sup> AI, p. 4.
- <sup>36</sup> CSW, para. 7.
- <sup>37</sup> FH, para. 4.
- <sup>38</sup> AI, p. 5. See also FH, paras. 7-11, HRW, p. 1, ICHRI, paras. 5 and 8, ICJ, p. 1-2.
- <sup>39</sup> KHRA, p. 3.
- <sup>40</sup> ADDI, p. 1.
- <sup>41</sup> FH, para. 3
- <sup>42</sup> ICHRI, para. 16.
- <sup>43</sup> IOCFASCN, para. 15.
- <sup>44</sup> IOCFASCN, para. 6.
- <sup>45</sup> IOCFASCN, paras. 9.
- <sup>46</sup> FH, para. 14.
- <sup>47</sup> GIEACPC, p. 2
- <sup>48</sup> GIEACPC, p. 1
- <sup>49</sup> FPC, para. 5.
- <sup>50</sup> ADAPP, pp. 3-4.
- <sup>51</sup> JS2, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>52</sup> See also ICJ, p. 2.
- <sup>53</sup> JS2, p. 2. See also ICJ, pp. 1-2.
- <sup>54</sup> JS2, p. 5. See also ICHRI, para. 2
- <sup>55</sup> JS2, p. 2. See also ICHRI, para. 3. See XIX - Article19, para. 10
- <sup>56</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 10
- <sup>57</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 7
- <sup>58</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 9. See also AI, p. 6, FH, para. 5.
- <sup>59</sup> JC, para. 3. See also BIC, p. 1.
- <sup>60</sup> BIC, para. 6. See also BIC, p.1, CSW, paras. 20-24 and FPC, para. 9, JC, paras. 4-5.
- <sup>61</sup> AI, pp. 5-6.
- <sup>62</sup> ICHRI, para. 4.
- <sup>63</sup> FPC, para. 2.
- <sup>64</sup> JS2, p. 6.
- <sup>65</sup> AI, p. 4. See also EI, paras. 18 -19, FH, para. 13, FPC, para. 20, ICHRI, para. 22.
- <sup>66</sup> EI, para. 23.
- <sup>67</sup> AI, p. 4. See also JC, p. 4, FPC, para. 14.
- <sup>68</sup> BIC, para. 10
- <sup>69</sup> MCWS, p. 4.
- <sup>70</sup> RACI, p. 5
- <sup>71</sup> WII, p. 6
- <sup>72</sup> JS1, p. 1 and p. 3. See also AI, p. 7, HRW, p. 4, ICJ, p. 5
- <sup>73</sup> XIX - Article 19, para. 8
- <sup>74</sup> BIC, para. 21

- 
- <sup>75</sup> AWA, para. 16.  
<sup>76</sup> IMCDS, p. 4  
<sup>77</sup> CSW, para. 10. See also OD  
<sup>78</sup> AI, p. 7. See also JS 2, p. 4, FPC, para. 11, IMCDS, pp.1-4  
<sup>79</sup> BHRC, p. 5.  
<sup>80</sup> BIC, para 7. See also CSW, para 3, HRW, p. 1.  
<sup>81</sup> BIC, para. 16  
<sup>82</sup> CSW, para. 25.  
<sup>83</sup> See also FRDI, p. 5.  
<sup>84</sup> HRW, p. 1.  
<sup>85</sup> AI, p. 4.  
<sup>86</sup> ICJ, p. 2.  
<sup>87</sup> JS3, para. 2  
<sup>88</sup> JS3, para. 4.  
<sup>89</sup> JS3, para. 22(a)  
<sup>90</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 4. See also HRW, p. 2.  
<sup>91</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 4  
<sup>92</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 6  
<sup>93</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 11. See also JS3, para. 14.  
<sup>94</sup> XIX - Article19, para. 11  
<sup>95</sup> XIX - Article19, Section on Recommendations in .p. 5.  
<sup>96</sup> HRW, p. 1.  
<sup>97</sup> KNTI, p. 5. See also YRKI.  
<sup>98</sup> KSAA, p. 6.  
<sup>99</sup> ITUC, para. 23.  
<sup>100</sup> HCSD, para. 6  
<sup>101</sup> WRC, para. 16  
<sup>102</sup> HCSD, para. 7  
<sup>103</sup> AEWS, pp. 2-3  
<sup>104</sup> BWTCCIM, p. 5.  
<sup>105</sup> EI, p.1.  
<sup>106</sup> EI, para. 4. See also HRW, p. 2.  
<sup>107</sup> EI, p. 5.  
<sup>108</sup> ISFA, para. 6, 14 and 16  
<sup>109</sup> DRZA, para 7. See also JTPLA, para. 8.  
<sup>110</sup> JTPLA, paras. 8 and 18-19. See also GOLAN.  
<sup>111</sup> CISV, paras. 9 and 10.  
<sup>112</sup> FPA IRI, para. 17  
<sup>113</sup> HFRN, p. 7  
<sup>114</sup> IAFA, para. 1.  
<sup>115</sup> WSAEP, para. 3  
<sup>116</sup> BIC, para. 12. See also EI, para. 27.  
<sup>117</sup> MECI, p. 3.  
<sup>118</sup> CSRDC, p. 5.  
<sup>119</sup> ISSRI, pp. 2-3  
<sup>120</sup> UNA-IRAN, p. 2.  
<sup>121</sup> AHRO, pp. 1 and 5.  
<sup>122</sup> SCNI, p. 5.  
<sup>123</sup> JS2, p. 4.  
<sup>124</sup> AI, p. 6. See also JS 2, p. 4, FPC, para. 11, IMCDS, pp.1-4  
<sup>125</sup> KHRA, p. 1. See also BHRC, p. 4.  
<sup>126</sup> BHRC, p. 8.  
<sup>127</sup> BHRC, p. 4.  
<sup>128</sup> ADAPP, p. 1.  
<sup>129</sup> CSW, para. 29.  
<sup>130</sup> ILIA, para. 20.  
<sup>131</sup> UNA-IRAN, pp. 3-4.

<sup>132</sup> UNA-IRAN, p. 3.

<sup>133</sup> JS2, p. 4.

<sup>134</sup> SGCII, para. 9.

<sup>135</sup> SGCII, para. 8.

<sup>136</sup> HEC, para. 16.

<sup>137</sup> MWJA, p. 4.

<sup>138</sup> MRCYO, p. 5.

<sup>139</sup> ILIA, para. 21.

<sup>140</sup> HFC, para. 22.

<sup>141</sup> FEI, para. 36.

-----